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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
DANIEL RODRIGUEZ,
Plaintiff, No. C 11-4084 PJH
v. ORDER GRANTING MOTION
TO DISMISS
SONY COMPUTER ENTERTAINMENT 
AMERICA LLC, et al., 
Defendants.
_______________________________/
Defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s second amended class action complaint
came on for hearing before this court on August 1, 2012.  Plaintiff Daniel Rodriguez
(“plaintiff”) appeared through his counsel, Rafey Balabanian and Ari Scharg.  Defendants
Sony Computer Entertainment America LLC (“SCEA”) and Sony Network Entertainment
International LLC (“SNEI”) (collectively, “defendants”) appeared through their counsel,
Michael Rhodes and Ray Sardo.  Having read all the papers submitted and carefully
considered the relevant legal authority, the court hereby GRANTS defendants’ motion as
follows:
BACKGROUND
This case arises under the Video Privacy Protection Act (“VPPA”), 18 U.S.C. §
2710(e), and is based on plaintiff’s allegations that defendants unlawfully retained and
disclosed plaintiff’s personally identifiable information (“PII”), including movie and video
game rental and purchase histories.  The VPPA requires companies to keep such PII
confidential, and further requires them to “destroy personally identifiable information as
soon as practicable, but no later than one year after the date when the information no
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1“SNEA” refers to Sony Network Entertainment America, Inc., which was merged into
SNEI on September 30, 2011.  
2
longer became necessary for the purpose for which it was collected.”  Plaintiff alleges that
defendants “systematically and intentionally violate the VPPA by indefinitely storing and
maintaining” the customers’ PII beyond the time period set out in the statute, and further
alleges that defendants unlawfully disclose the customers’ PII without permission.
Plaintiff Rodriguez signed up for the PlayStation Network (“PSN”) service in or about
February 2008.  At the time, PSN was managed by SCEA.  Rodriguez rented and
purchased several movies between 2009 and 2011.  Plaintiff claims that SCEA disclosed
his rental and purchase histories to SNEI and SNEA1 without his consent, in violation of the
VPPA.  Plaintiff also alleges that, since September 2011, SNEI (who took over PSN
management from SCEA) continues to disclose customers’ PII to SCEA without consent. 
Plaintiff first filed suit on August 18, 2011, asserting a single cause of action under
the VPPA.  Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on November 30, 2011.  But before
the motion was heard, plaintiff filed his first amended complaint on December 21, 2011,
again asserting a single cause of action under the VPPA.  On February 3, 2012,
defendants moved to dismiss the first amended complaint, and that motion was heard by
this court on April 18, 2012.  At the hearing, plaintiff explained that his cause of action
consisted of separate prongs for “retention” and “disclosure” of PII.  Defendants noted that
the Sixth and Seventh Circuits had both issued opinions relating to the scope of the VPPA,
and that both had found that there is no private right of action with respect to the retention
claim.  See  Sterk v. Redbox Automated Retail, LLC, 672 F.3d 535 (7th Cir. 2012); Daniel
v. Cantrell, 375 F.3d 377 (6th Cir. 2004).  The court adopted the reasoning of those courts,
and dismissed plaintiff’s “retention” claims with prejudice.  With respect to the disclosure
claim, defendants argued that the allegedly improper disclosures actually fell within a VPPA
carve-out, which allows disclosures made in the ordinary course of business, including
transfer of ownership.  The court agreed, and on this basis, dismissed plaintiff’s claims with
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3
respect to intra-Sony disclosures with prejudice, and granted leave to amend only as to any
possible disclosure to non-Sony entities.  In the first amended complaint, plaintiff did not
specifically allege that any such outside disclosures had been made.  Instead, his
allegations were based only on the fact that defendants reserved the right to make such
disclosures in their privacy policy. 
On May 16, 2012, plaintiff filed his second amended complaint (“SAC”), which is the
subject of this motion.  While plaintiff’s allegations still relate to the same PII-related actions
taken by Sony, the complaint is now split into three causes of action.  First, plaintiff re-
asserts a “retention” claim under the VPPA.  Second, plaintiff asserts a “disclosure” claim
under the VPPA, based on SCEA and SNEI’s disclosures to each other, and to SNEA. 
Plaintiff does not allege that any disclosures were made to non-Sony entities.  Third,
plaintiff asserts a breach of contract claim, arguing that “confidentiality of [] PII and timely
destruction of same” was part of the benefit of the bargain between defendants and their
customers, and that failure to meet those obligations constituted a material breach of
contract.  Plaintiff also splits the putative class into subclasses, based on whether their
allegations stem from allegedly unlawful “retention” or “disclosure.”   
LEGAL STANDARD
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests for the legal sufficiency of the claims
alleged in the complaint.  Ileto v. Glock, Inc., 349 F.3d 1191, 1199-1200 (9th Cir. 2003).
Review is limited to the contents of the complaint.  Allarcom Pay Television, Ltd. v. Gen.
Instrument Corp., 69 F.3d 381, 385 (9th Cir. 1995). To survive a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim, a complaint generally must satisfy only the minimal notice pleading
requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8.  Rule 8(a)(2) requires only that the
complaint include a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).  Specific facts are unnecessary – the statement
need only give the defendant “fair notice of the claim and the grounds upon which it rests.” 
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
555 (2007)).  All allegations of material fact are taken as true.  Id. at 94.  However, a
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4
plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief “requires more than
labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
not do.”  Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations and quotations omitted).  Rather, the
allegations in the complaint “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative
level.”  Id.
A motion to dismiss should be granted if the complaint does not proffer enough facts
to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.  See id. at 558-59. “[W]here the
well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]’-‘that the pleader is entitled to
relief.’”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 
DISCUSSION
As an initial matter, the court notes that its previous order granting defendants’
motion to dismiss clearly stated that “[t]o the extent plaintiff’s claim under the [VPPA] is
premised on a claim for unlawful retention of plaintiff’s personally identifiable information
(“PII”), the VPPA precludes claims premised solely on a defendant’s allegedly unauthorized
‘retention’ of information.”  See Dkt. 59 at 1 (emphasis added) (dismissing retention claim
with prejudice).  However, despite this dismissal, plaintiff’s retention-based claim has
resurfaced in a variety of different packages.  First, plaintiff re-alleges the exact same
retention claim under the VPPA, but notes that he “reasserts such claim . . . for appeal
purposes only.”  Dkt. 63 at 18, n.7.  Second, as part of the same cause of action, plaintiff
seeks to enforce the same provision of the VPPA through a different procedural vehicle. 
Specifically, plaintiff alleges that 18 U.S.C. § 2707 (also referred to as the Stored
Communications Act, or “SCA”) provides him with an independent means to seek damages
for VPPA violations, separate and apart from the VPPA’s own damages provision.  Finally,
plaintiff’s third attempt to re-assert his retention claim is presented in the form of a breach
of contract claim.  Plaintiff argues that the terms of the VPPA were implicitly incorporated
into a contract between the parties, and that defendants’ alleged retention of plaintiff’s PII
constituted a breach of that contract.  Importantly, both plaintiff’s SCA claim and breach of
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2Specifically, the SCA and the breach of contract claims both seek to enforce the
retention-related provision of the VPPA, found at 18 U.S.C. § 2710(e) (also referred to as the
“Destruction of Old Records” provision).  
5
contract claim involve the same factual allegations as the already-dismissed VPPA claim,
and both are premised on the same language from the VPPA2.     
Plaintiff’s SCA claim is based on the following language:  “[any] person aggrieved by
any violation of this chapter . . . may, in a civil action, recover from the person or entity . . .
which engaged in that violation such relief as may be appropriate.”  18 U.S.C. § 2707(a). 
Plaintiff notes that the VPPA is contained within the same chapter as the SCA, and thus
argues that the SCA provides an alternate means of enforcing the VPPA’s ban on PII
retention.  Defendants concede that both provisions are contained within the same literal
chapter, but point out that when the SCA was enacted, the VPPA did not yet exist.  Thus,
any reference to “this chapter” should only be read as a reference to the remainder of the
SCA.  Defendants also cite to the VPPA’s own civil liability provision, which they argue
should trump the SCA’s provision.   
This court is not the first to consider the SCA’s applicability to the VPPA.  In a case
brought by the same plaintiffs’ counsel that represent plaintiff Rodriguez, the Northern
District of Illinois faced the question presented here, and held that “[c]onsideration of the
language of section 2707 in the context of the statute leads the Court to conclude that
Congress did not intend for plaintiffs to be able to bring a VPPA retention claim under the
SCA.”  Sterk v. Redbox Automated Retail, LLC, 2012 WL 3006674, at *2 (N.D. Ill. July 23,
2012).  The court noted that “[w]hen Congress originally enacted the SCA . . . it could not
have intended for the SCA’s authorization of civil suits to apply to the VPPA, because the
VPPA did not yet exist” and further held that “[t]he fact that Congress included a provision
in the VPPA authorizing civil suits suggests that it did not think that the SCA’s cause of
action provision applied to the VPPA.”  Id.  The Sterk court then pointed to the Seventh
Circuit’s opinion regarding plaintiffs’ VPPA claims, and concluded that “[i]f Congress, as the
Seventh Circuit has determined, did not intend that plaintiffs have a cause of action for
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retention under the VPPA, then it is unlikely that it intended for plaintiffs to have a remedy
under the more general and older SCA.”  Id. at *3
The court finds the reasoning of Sterk to be persuasive, and adopts it here.  Plaintiff
cannot be permitted to have a second bite at the VPPA apple, and his attempts to
repackage his VPPA claim as an SCA claim are rejected.  Thus, the court hereby
DISMISSES plaintiff’s first cause of action for unlawful retention in full, and again, with
prejudice.
Plaintiff makes one more attempt to pursue his VPPA claim for unlawful retention. 
Seeking a third bite of the VPPA apple, plaintiff asserts a breach of contract claim on behalf
of himself and two “unlawful retention” subclasses, alleging that he “entered into binding
contracts for movie/video game rentals and purchases,” and that “the laws existing at the
time and place of the making of a contract are incorporated into the contract.”  See SAC at
¶¶ 112-113.  Specifically, plaintiff claims that defendants’ “failure to perform their
contractual obligations imposed by the VPPA . . . constitutes a material breach” of contract. 
Id. at ¶ 115.  In essence, plaintiff makes the same allegations here that he does in his first
cause of action, but claims that defendants’ alleged violations of the VPPA also constitute
breaches of contract.  Critically, plaintiff does not point to any specific document as
memorializing the supposed contract between the parties, and specifically refutes the
suggestion that the PSN Terms of Service (“TOS”) served as the contract between the
parties.  See Dkt. 67 at 24 (“Plaintiff’s allegations of breach do not refer to, rely upon, or
otherwise incorporate the PSN Privacy Policy and TOS documents”).  Instead, plaintiff
claims that “all the terms of the contract between Plaintiff and SCEA are alleged through
the SAC and memorialized in the VPPA.”  Id.  Thus, plaintiff does not allege that the VPPA
was expressly incorporated into any contract between the parties, but instead appears to
be arguing that the VPPA itself created a contract between plaintiff and defendants.  The
court views this cause of action as another end-run around plaintiff’s already-dismissed
VPPA claim.  Having lost on the VPPA retention issue, plaintiff attempts to repackage the
exact same claim related to the exact same conduct, first as an SCA claim, and now as a
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breach of contract claim.  The Supreme Court has rejected similar attempts, holding that
when a plaintiff has no right to sue under a federal statute, it cannot bring a breach of
contract suit for the same conduct, alleging that the contract’s terms are the same as that
of the statute.  Astra v. Santa Clara County, 131 S.Ct. 1342, 1345 (2011).  Because this
court has already determined that “the VPPA precludes claims premised solely on a
defendant’s allegedly unauthorized ‘retention’ of information,” it follows that Astra directly
applies here.  Plaintiff has no right to sue under the VPPA for alleged unlawful retention,
and thus cannot bring the same substantive claim dressed in “breach of contract” clothing. 
Thus, plaintiff’s third cause of action is DISMISSED with prejudice.                   
Finally, plaintiff asserts one cause of action related to the alleged unlawful disclosure
of PII.  The court again refers back to its previous dismissal order, which granted leave to
amend only “as to plaintiff’s claim for unlawful disclosure to DOE defendants.”  Dkt. 59 at 2. 
Leave to amend was not granted as to claims that SCEA disclosed PII to SNEI.  Id. 
However, plaintiff’s second cause of action still relies on allegations of intra-Sony
disclosure, and does not allege that any disclosures were made to outside “Doe”
defendants.  Thus, plaintiff’s second cause of action fails to comply with the court’s prior
dismissal order, and is hereby DISMISSED with prejudice for the reasons stated in the prior
order and at both hearings.
The Clerk shall close the file.   
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: September 25, 2012
______________________________
PHYLLIS J. HAMILTON
United States District Judge
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